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 Negatively reviewed by readers from both ends of the political spectrum, Ivan 
Turgenev’s final novel, Virgin Soil (1877), explores the nature of patriarchy within the context of 
the particular kind of populism (Narodnichestvo) that swept across the European part of Russia 
in the 1870s.  In this novel, Turgenev continues to explore the theme of fractured father-son 
relationships as he investigates the long-standing tradition of viewing the Russian tsar as a father 
to his people.  Within the framework of this family metaphor, which is often used in political 
discourse, Turgenev conceptualizes Russian radical intelligentsia as a natural son of an 
enlightened father.  Educated and restless youth represent a logical, albeit unexpected, outcome 
of Tsar Peter’s reforms that were intended to replace family ties with bureaucratic ties and to 
give opportunities for advancement to the non-noble.  As an illegitimate child, however, the 
intelligentsia does not fit into the official state or family structure and acts as an interested yet 
annoying outsider.  While drawing on the scholarship of Stephen Lovell and other social 
historians who explore the problem of genealogical and generational self-identification, this 
examination of Turgenev’s oeuvre provides new legibilities of the family metaphor that lies at 
the core of Russian political discourse. 
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Cutting the umbilical cord: patriarchy and the family metaphor in Turgenev’s Virgin Soil 
 
Introduction 
Anticipating the reaction of both conservative and progressive readers to his latest novel, 
in November 1876 Ivan Turgenev wrote to a friend, ‘There’s absolutely no doubt that if for 
Fathers and Children I was beaten with sticks, for Virgin Soil I will be pummeled with logs—
and from both sides, too.’1  Of the six novels that Turgenev wrote in the course of his literary 
career, Virgin Soil (1877) may be considered the ‘most political’ as it turns the readers’ attention 
to the wave of a particular kind of populism (Narodnichestvo) that swept across the European 
part of Russia in the 1870s.2  At the same time, the novel continues to explore the theme of 
fractured father-son relationships, taken up by Turgenev in his earlier works.  Drawing on the 
scholarship of Stephen Lovell and other social historians who explore the problem of 
genealogical and generational self-identification, this paper will argue that in his final novel, 
Virgin Soil, Turgenev metaphorically presents the Russian intelligentsia as illegitimate children 
of the Russian tsar who attempts to play the role of an enlightened patriarch.  This examination 
of Turgenev’s oeuvre provides new legibilities of the family metaphor that lies at the core of 
Russian political discourse. 
 
The Family Concept and Metaphor 
Contemporary Russian sociologists define a family as ‘a social union’ that ‘consists of 
people and their mutual relations’ who are ‘linked together by a common way of life, mutual 
moral responsibility and assistance.’3 Beyond its immediate concerns, a family ‘constitutes not 
only a basic unit of society, but a basis for the metaphors that shape today’s socio-political value 
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orientations’ (Zritneva 1).  George Lakoff and Mark Johnson explain that when most ordinary 
notions acquire metaphorical meanings they begin to shape moral values and judgments 
prevalent within a group.4  Thus, ‘[t]he concepts that govern our thought are not just matters of 
the intellect. They also govern our everyday functioning, down to the most mundane details’ 
(Lakoff and Johnson 22).  Because it accompanies most individuals throughout their whole life, 
the concept of the family naturally lends itself to being heavily metaphorized and endowed with 
certain socio-political weight.  
Boris Mironov, whose Social History of Imperial Russia covers a period between 1700 
and 1917, examines the family concept in a broad historical perspective, demonstrating that 
family relations and social relations at large ‘tend to intertwine and reinforce one another,’ 
making the family a useful tool in studying a society as a whole.5  By the time of Turgenev’s 
writing, both the Russian family the Russian state could be considered nothing if not patriarchal.6  
In the present analysis, I agree with Susan Morrissey who defines patriarchy as ‘relations of 
governance presided over by a “father”’ who dominates over all of his subjects—both male and 
female—indiscriminately.7  She explains:  
 
While patriarchy is built upon a concept of gender domination, to restrict its use to 
instances of male rule over females addresses neither the varieties of female experience 
as mediated, for example, by class nor other (gendered) relations of domination and 
submission.  In its broader sense, therefore, the term ‘patriarchy’ accentuates the 
analogous structures of power in a society—between the tsar and his servitors, the lord 
and his serfs, the husband and his wife, the master and his apprentice, the officer and his 
soldiers, and so forth. (Morrissey 24)8   
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The characterization of the Russian tsar as a father of his people is propagated in many 
venues.9  The folk proverb ‘Without a tsar, the people is an orphan and the land is a widow’ [Без 
царя народ сирота, земля вдова] not only sums up the tremendously important, stabilizing role 
that a Russian ruler plays in the society he governs, but suggests a level of emotional intimacy 
ordinarily expected within a nuclear family.10  The appellation ‘Our tsar! Father of the people!’ 
[Царь ты наш!  отец народа!] from Alexander Pushkin’s fictional Tale of the Golden Cockerel 
(1834) is echoed in open letters to the emperor that were published in newspapers throughout the 
nineteenth century and reflects the emotional connection that the vast majority of the population 
of the Russian empire felt towards the tsar.11  Grigorii Rasputin appeals to the same sentiment in 
the letter he sent to Nicholas II from Siberia, pleading with the monarch to not get entangled in 
the conflict that later will be known as World War I: ‘You are the tsar, the father to the people, 
do not suffer the insane to triumph’ [Ты царь отец народа не попусти безумным 
торжествовать].12  After Nicholas II, who considered himself ‘a master of the Russian land,’ 
was brutally removed from the pedestal by the Bolsheviks, the new regime made use of the same 
metaphors in the ensuing decades.13  The patriarchal socio-political outlook easily survived 
throughout the Soviet period, when Communist leaders compared the party to a family ‘with 
themselves in the position of the parent.’14  This sentiment is still expressed by some Russian 
citizens towards Russia’s president today.15 
In Turgenev’s lifetime, the patriarchal mindset overcame even the cultural rift between 
the nobility and the serfs that had formed in the wake of Peter the Great’s far-reaching reforms.16  
The most traditional and conservative segment of Russia’s population, its peasant class, viewer 
family not only in biological, but also in economic terms, which led the Russian zemstvo 
statisticians to defined a peasant family unit as ‘a number of people constantly eating at one table 
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or having eaten from one pot.’17  Mironov notes that prior to 1861, ‘the large, multigenerational, 
patriarchal household’ functioned ‘according to an age- and gender-based division of labor’ and 
in essence represented ‘an absolutist state in microcosm’ (Mironov and Eklov 145).  At the same 
time, Hubbs states, the Russian nobility too ‘deferred to the will of the autocrat’ and ‘saw in the 
role of the father the need for domination and self-assertion over the land, the peasantry, and a 
family structure’ (Hubbs 166).  Thus, personalized authority was the chief governing force both 
on the level of an isolated patriarchal household and on the level of the state as a whole.18 
 
From Genealogy to Generation 
Despite the strong sense of belonging that the Russian patriarchal society fostered in its 
members, in the second half of the nineteenth century, and especially in the 1860s, Russia 
experienced what Lovell identifies as ‘one of the most acute recorded cases of generational 
rebellion’ and ‘the first of its kind anywhere in Europe.’ 19  At this time, activists from among the 
student population incessantly called for ‘the burning of one’s ships,’ thus symbolically 
‘severing the umbilical cord’ and declaring independence from the fathers.20  The 
intergenerational conflict that is so famously, albeit inconclusively, described in Fathers and 
Sons reflects the fissures that were becoming apparent in the foundation of the patriarchal state.  
On closer examination, however, if one were to read all of Turgenev’s major works as the author 
suggested, ‘one after another’ [сподряд], one will notice the consistent feature that appears in 
each of one them—young men estranged from their biological fathers.21   
Turgenev’s six novels constitute one coherent fictional metanarrative centered around 
one theme.  Fatherless children—illegitimate and/or orphaned sons—appear in each of the six 
novels and represent those within Russian society whose social status is precarious precisely 
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because their position within their own families is uncertain.  Heroines too, though never 
illegitimate, are estranged from their fathers.  In Turgenev’s first published novel, Rudin (1856), 
the father of the eponymous protagonist dies soon after his birth, and Rudin is raised by a 
widowed mother.  In The Nest of Gentry (1859), Lavretsky, the protagonist, is born from parents 
in a morganatic union between a landowner and a serf girl, is abandoned by the father for a time, 
and loses his mother at a young age.  The protagonist of On the Eve (1859-60), Insarov, is of 
legitimate birth, but is orphaned at the age of eight.  In Fathers and Children (1862), the warmth 
between one of the fathers of the title, Nikolay Kirsanov, and his older son, Arkady, is more of 
an exception than a rule; nevertheless, Arkady’s half-brother, Mitya, is illegitimate, and although 
Nikolay later marries Mitya’s mother, Fenechka, from a legal standpoint, Mitya will remain 
illegitimate and will have no claim on his father’s property or title.22  Although the protagonist of 
Smoke (1867) is a legitimate son of a still living father, the father of his competitor, officer 
Ratmirov, is a natural son of a nobleman.  Finally, in Virgin Soil (1877), the protagonist, 
Nezhdanov, is a natural son of a nobleman. 
Twenty-one years separate Rudin and Virgin Soil, putting the children in the first novel in 
the position of much older siblings, if not fathers, in the last, yet the conflict remains essentially 
the same: noble fathers are failing their children emotionally, financially, or in other ways, while 
fatherless sons—born out of wedlock, orphaned before entering adulthood, or both—struggle to 
find their place in life.23  Notably, before these ‘superfluous men’ were described in fiction, a 
similar pattern of failed father-son relationships unfolded in real life: 
 
A high proportion of the homes from which the leading intelligenty came offered neither 
the love nor the stability needed for the normal development of happy human beings.  
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Again and again as we glance through the biographies of the intelligentsia, we find that 
the child was illegitimate (Pnin, Zhukovsky, Polezhaev, Herzen), or early lost one or both 
parents and was brought up by remoter relations or servants (Chaadayev, Lermontov, 
Tolstoy, Kropotkin), or grew up in a home shadowed by the indifference or unhappy 
temperaments of one or both parents (Pushkin, Belinsky, Turgenev, Dostoevsky).24 
 
The reality that was nourishing the imaginations of Russian fiction writers and ideologues 
was rarely carefree.  More than half of the individuals listed by Seely were either threatened with 
or actually spent time in prison or exile for anti-government sentiment or activities.  Among 
them, the earliest birth date belongs to the poet Ivan Petrovich Pnin (b. 1773), and the latest 
death date belongs to the anarchist and revolutionary Pyotr Alexeevich Kropotkin (d. 1921), 
spanning a century and a half of what appears to be an ideological stand-off between the 
bureaucratic state and the intelligentsia, couched in familial terms.25 
Lovell puts forth the idea that although any member of a society can conceptualize his or 
her ‘location in time’ in one of two ways—genealogy or generation—these two notions are not 
mutually exclusive (567, 590).  Whereas the former ‘takes its bearings from lines of family 
descent,’ ‘provides a vertical sense of belonging that defines the people of the present in terms of 
their ancestors,’ and ‘concentrates on succession,’ the latter is customarily measured by ‘cohorts 
of people born at approximately the same time,’ ‘emphasizes simultaneity,’ and ‘potentially 
transcends kin’ (Lovell 567).  Nevertheless, one can see oneself simultaneously as a descendant 
from a genealogical line and a coeval to like-minded peers, which ultimately was the 
intelligentsia’s method of dual self-conception (Lovell 590).  It is this dual self-conception that 
leads Turgenev’s fatherless sons to their demise. 
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Fatherless Children  
In Turgenev’s Virgin Soil, the protagonist, Alexei Nezhdanov, attempts to define his 
identity through his interaction with a new generation of political activists, yet his connection to 
his genealogy does not allow him to fully embrace their political cause.  Unable to overcome this 
contradiction, he chooses to end his own life, demonstrating the impossibility of overcoming 
both the external conflict (between political patriarchy and individual citizens) and his own 
internal conflict (between his genealogical connection to the ruling class and his desire to be 
accepted by the masses).  
Alexei Nezhdanov’s birth is a result of an extramarital liaison of Prince G. and the young 
woman, Nastya, who worked in the prince’s home as a governess.  The father did not anticipate 
Alexei’s birth and therefore gave him a last name that means ‘the unexpected one.’26  
Nezhdanov’s mother died in childbirth, leaving Alexei an orphan.  Although little is known 
about Prince G., the reader is informed that ‘thanks to father’s kindness’ Nezhdanov was able to 
obtain a university education and now receives a pension; however, as Nezhdanov’s half-brother 
notes, Alexei has ‘gone completely mad; he’s some sort of republican and we don’t receive 
him… Il est impossible’ (19). 
Because of his education, Nezhdanov is qualified to engage in intellectual work or in 
state service; however, possibilities for the former are rather limited, and engaging in the latter 
would be contrary to his political convictions.  Additionally, he does not fit into an archaic rank 
system of civil or military ranks, and as an illegitimate son, he will never be equal to his half-
siblings.  Desiring to be of service to the common folk, he joins an underground circle of the 
narodniks, but that does not resolve the question of his identity.  When Nezhdanov refuses to 
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accept financial help from Paklin, a fellow activist, he is called out on neglecting the common 
cause due to his class origin: 
 
‘Well, brother,’ said Paklin, ‘I can see that you may be a revolutionary, but you’re 
no democrat.’ 
‘Come straight out with it—I’m an aristocrat.’ 
‘You are indeed an aristocrat—to a certain extent.’ 
Nezhdanov gave a forced laugh. 
‘That is, you wish to allude to the fact that I’m an illegitimate son.  Your labours 
are in vain my friend … I don’t need you to remind me of the fact.’ (14) 
 
Even without Paklin’s observation that one’s lineage colors one’s political convictions 
Nezhdanov is already painfully aware of the burden his kinship presents to him.  Soon after the 
conversation with Paklin, Nezhdanov goes to a theatre where he takes a seat in a front row.  At 
first he intended to buy a cheaper ticket for the stalls, but just as he was ready to pay, he heard an 
officer’s voice over his head: ‘“He”—that is Nezhdanov—“will probably need change, but I 
don’t.  So please give me a front-row ticket as quick as you can—I’m in a hurry!”’ (18).  
Nezhdanov, whether to prove his own ability or to satisfy his pride, hands the clerk three roubles 
and buys himself a much more expensive ticket.  When the play starts, he finds himself sitting 
between ‘a general emblazoned with stars’ and a very elegant gentleman who later turns out to 
be Privy Counsellor Sipyagin (18).  Nezhdanov is uncomfortable in his surroundings.  He sits 
‘motionless and awkward, in his wide comfortable seat, like some sort of pariah.  His heart [is] 
full of bitterness, shame and revulsion,’ and he doesn’t even enjoy the play, which happens to be 
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Alexander Ostrovsky’s comedy Don’t Sit in Another Man’s Sledge, designed to ridicule the 
society in which ranks and wealth determine characters’ treatment of each other (18).27 
Sipyaging offers Nezhdanov a position of a tutor to his son for the duration of the 
summer, which Nezhdanov accepts for two reasons.  One, the pension provided by Prince G. is 
not big enough to support Nezhdanov in his underground activities, and two, Nezhdanov sees it 
as an opportunity to rest at Sipyagin’s country estate until the fall as he prepares for the actual 
work of spreading propaganda among provincial peasants and factory workers.  Sipyagin, in his 
turn, attempts to position himself as an enlightened patriarch.  He is a state functionary, loyal to 
the tsar, but he recommends himself to Nezhdanov ‘as a man of liberal, progressive convictions’ 
that do not contradict those of Nezhdanov.  Later Sipyagin admits to being ‘to some degree a 
Slavophile, and while he likes Nezhdanov’s ‘youthful ardour,’ he concedes that his wife’s views 
‘are perhaps closer’ to Nezhdanov’s than to his own; but that is ‘to be expected: she’s younger 
than me!’ Sipyagin adds (21, 47).   
At the estate, Nezhdanov meets Sipyagin’s niece, Marianna, who is an orphan and lives 
there as her uncle’s ward.  When the ideological tension becomes unbearable and Nezhdanov 
finally leaves Sipyagin’s home, Marianna insists on going with him more on ideological grounds 
than on romantic ones.28  Evidently, Mrs. Sipyagin, Marianna, and Nezhdanov belong to the 
same generation, which makes it easier for them to be open to the new ideas, yet in the end of 
these three characters only Marianna fully embraces Narodnichestvo. 
This unique brand of Russian populism was o the rise in the early and mid-1870s.  
Described as an ‘incompletely integrated complex of ideas [that] had as its core an ethically and 
emotionally motivated agrarian Socialism,’ Narodnichesvto was especially appealing to young 
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raznochintsy like Nezhdanov.29  Avram Yarmolinsky explains what Narodnichestvo is in the 
following terms:  
 
The term, which gained currency in the ‘seventies, suggests the important part played in 
this ideology by the concept of narod (people), in the sense of demos, the broad social 
base, the great body of manual workers, specifically the peasantry.  With concern for the 
material welfare of the masses went a mystique which surrounded ‘the people’ with a 
halo.  Some viewed them as potentially or actually an irresistible historical force; others 
as the repository of all the virtues, the sole source of spiritual energy and thus the hope of 
the world. (170-1)30 
 
Those who embraced Narodnichestvo had lost any hope of convincing the government of 
the need for social reform.  The activists believed that if they educate the masses by exposing 
them to modern ideas, in time these masses will either engage in revolutionary action themselves 
or will accept radical changes brought about by others (Elizabeth Wood 359).  For those who, 
like Nezhdanov, could not find a place for themselves within an established system, the idea of 
Going to the People becames a last resort.   
Turgenev wrote Virgin Soil simultaneously with the formation and the disintegration of 
the Going to the People movement as the narodniki court trials were taking place.  He first 
mentioned his idea for Virgin Soil in July 1870, before the movement picked up speed, but put it 
aside for some time.  When he returned to it in 1876, he wrote the entire novel in the course of 
five months and 25 days and published it in the first two issues of the 1877 volume of The 
Herald of Europe (Turgenev, PSS 12: 478).  The year 1873 marked the high point for the 
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narodniki, which was followed by ‘the mad summer’ of 1874, as Pyotr Kropotkin calls it, when 
hundreds of people, perhaps even between two and three thousand, were on the march (Feuer 98, 
Yarmolinsky 189).  This movement, of course, did not go unnoticed by the police.  Overall, 
between 1873 and 1876, 1,611 political suspects (85% men) were questioned, 557 of this number 
were then dismissed, 450 were placed under police surveillance, 79 were deported to distant 
parts of the Empire, and 525 were held for court trial (Yarmolinsky 205).  Later the same year, 
the majority of the narodniki court trials took place.  After four years of investigation, The Great 
Trial, or The Trial of 193, which according to some estimates initially involved 3,800 people 
including witnesses, took place between October 18, 1877 and January 23, 1878 (207).31  Cases 
of insanity and death in prison were frequent, many of which were caused by solitary 
confinement (Yarmolinsky 207, Soburova and Eklof 120-122, 152-6).  In other words, despite 
the novel’s artistic qualities and fictional character, Turgenev was writing Virgin Soil almost in 
the form of a current events report, and Nezhdanov’s suicide at the end of the novel is not 
farfetched considering the actual flow of events. 
The narodniki placed an especially high value on two things that most of them possessed: 
youth and simplicity.  Indeed, their youth was a mark of distinction.  As Sergei Kovalik, one of 
the participants of the movement, writes in his memoirs, ‘[i]n the 1870s, eschewing the 
participation of an older generation inclined to compromise, the youth set out all alone, to 
resolve all (of Russia’s) cursed questions which gave humanity no respite.  This generation 
resolved to take upon its own shoulders the entire burden of rejuvenating the world.’32  Youth 
was a sign of hope, a new beginning, a possibility of a renewal for the society as a whole. 
At the same time, breaking away both from their biological fathers and from the 
bureaucratic state, young people—both men and women—strived to simplify their own lifestyle 
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[опроститься].  One reason for this was their disdain of all material excess in the face of the 
common people’s plight.  While staying in the Russian countryside in the summer of 1872, 
Turgenev encountered a girl of noble birth who had embraced the simple lifestyle and was hired 
to work in the kitchen ‘in order to come closer to the simple folk and to experience its life first-
hand’ [чтобы сблизиться с простым народом и на себе испытать его жизнь] (Turgenev, PSS 
12: 481).  Like this girl, Marianna in Virgin Soil is also eager to embrace the simple life and even 
insists that she should not be called ‘miss’ [барышня] or be given a servant; instead, she would 
prefer ‘not a maid but a helper, American-style’ (Turgenev, Virgin Soil 175).   
At the root of this transformation lies the concept of a ‘repentant nobleman,’ when young 
people from the privileged class attempted to expiate the sins of their serf-owning predecessors.33  
Yet the more important reason for ‘simplification’ was the belief that by doing so the young 
activists would be able to break down the barriers between themselves and the common folk.  
This ‘simplification’ was often the first step towards becoming actively engaged in revolutionary 
activity, and this symbolic laying aside of the clothes of one class in order to put on peasant garb 
was the first symbolic step of ‘a spiritual adventure.’34  When Nezhdanov prepares to go to the 
people, he disguises himself so well that even Marianna cannot recognize him at first.  ‘He was 
wearing a threadbare yellowish nankeen kaftan with minuscule buttons and a high waist; he had 
done his hair Russian-style, with a straight parting; he had wrapped a blue muffler round his 
neck; in his hand he held a cap with a broken peak; and on his feet he had unpolished calfskin 
boots’ (Turgenev, Virgin Soil 175, 186).  When Marianna finally recognizes him, she observes, 
‘You look like some sort of municipal shopkeeper, a pedlar or a retired house serf’ (187).  But 
this attempt at a transformation does not come easily to Nezhdanov.  Despite all his efforts, the 
change is superficial, and he feels out of place: ‘in his heart of hearts [he] was annoyed and 
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embarrassed; so embarrassed was he that he kept running the outstretched fingers of both hands 
over his chest, as if he were brushing himself down’ (187).  He confesses to Marianna: ‘I would 
note in parentheses that this doesn’t do much for my self-esteem’ (187). 
The activists also changed their usual apparel for practical reasons.  Disguised as the 
common folk, narodniki hoped to become less visible to the police.  Nonetheless, this method 
was not fool-proof, for often the people they preached to turned them over to the police as 
suspicious provocateurs.  Nezhdanov avoids an arrest, but has to go through a more painful 
experience when he realizes that he has failed as a propagandist and is now completely 
disillusioned in the very cause of Narodnichestvo.  After another unsuccessful attempt at talking 
to factory workers, Nezhdanov confides in Marianna, ‘I no longer believe in the cause which 
united us, for which we left that house together and towards which I, to tell the truth, was already 
growing cool when your fire warmed and ignited me; I no longer believe in it, no longer’ (242).  
Nezhdanov has no place in his father’s noble family or in Sipyagin’s home, but neither does he 
have a place among the simple people whom he wishes to serve.  Ruth Perry explains that 
traditionally, ‘the rules of kinship determine both the obligations of the individual to his/her kin 
group or family in the broadest sense, and, reciprocally, the claims of an individual on the 
resources of the kin group.’35  These include such things as ‘absolute property rights and use 
rights, productive labor and care-giving […] political power, and the social position, rank, or 
reputation of one descent group vis-à-vis other descent groups’ (Perry 4).  Nezhdanov, on the 
one hand, benefits from the educational opportunities that his father provides for him and from 
the employment in Sipyagin’s home, but pays both of them back by rejecting their conservative 
values.  At the same time, as he takes upon himself an obligation to serve the masses and to give 
of his abundance, he is rejected by the folk and runs the risk of being punished by the state.  
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In V.A. Nedzvetsky’s estimate, of all Turgenev’s characters Nezhdanov comes to the 
revolutionary movement the closest, but his disenchantment and ultimate failure is caused by his 
inability to ‘forget about himself’ and live solely for others.36  But perhaps Nezhdanov cannot 
forget himself because he lacks a clear understanding of who he is in the first place, and this lack 
of a clear understanding of his personal identity is caused by his problematic relationships with 
his father and by his status of an illegitimate son.  Turgenev writes about Nezhdanov: 
 
The false position in which he had been placed since birth had developed touchinesss and 
irritability in him, but his innate magnanimity did not allow him to become suspicious or 
mistrusting.  The same false position explained the clashing contradictions in 
Nezhdanov’s character.  Neat to the point of punctiliousness, horribly squeamish, he 
forced himself to be cynical and coarse in his speech.  An idealist by nature, passionate, 
chaste, bold and timid simultaneously, he was ashamed of his timidity and chasteness as 
of something dishonourable, and considered his duty to laugh at ideals.  He had a tender 
heart and shunned people; he angered easily—and never remembered the anger.  He was 
indignant with his father for launching him ‘into aesthetics’; he openly, for all to see, 
occupied himself solely with political and social questions, professed the most extreme of 
opinions (they were no mere phrases for him), but secretly he reveled in art, poetry and 
beauty in all their manifestations, even writing verses himself… Nothing so offended and 
outraged Nezhdanov as the slightest allusion to his poetic efforts, to this, so he imagined 
unforgivable weakness… His friends liked him: they were attracted by his inner 
rectitude, goodness and purity.  But Nezhdanov was not born under a lucky star; life was 
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not easy for him.  He himself was profoundly aware of this and felt himself isolated, 
despite the devotion of his friends. (Turgenev, Virgin Soil 26) 
 
Nezhdanov’s painful self-awareness competes with his unclear sense of personal identity.  
In the eyes of everyone in his father’s social circle, were Nezhdanov ever try to elevate himself 
to their level, he would forever remain an impostor.  Yet when Nezhdanov attempts to go to the 
people and serve the oppressed masses, he sees that there too he is not accepted.  The conflict 
that Nezhdanov faces is intensified by the fact that in Imperial Russia one’s loyalty to the family 
and one’s loyalty to the bureaucracy were inseparable.  Lovell points out a paradox:  
 
the Russian state was both modernizing and archaicizing.  On the one hand, it wanted to 
tear noble sons away from their clan and to extract from them devoted service to a 
modern bureaucratic war-making and tax-raising machine.  On the other hand, like all 
other absolutist states, it made use of handy patriarchal rhetoric [where] the head of the 
state was presented as a domineering yet benevolent father. (570-1) 
 
As blood relations are replaced with bureaucratic connections, Turgenev’s orphaned and 
illegitimate male characters are lost within a system that offers no warmth yet demands loyalty.  
in Virgin Soil, Nezhdanov resolves this tension by committing suicide, thus completely removing 
himself both from his father’s biological family that has no place for him and from a future 





Political Underpinnings of the family Metaphor 
Both in its literal and its metaphorical sense, the family has long been one of the key tools 
for conceptualizing the Russian socio-political model, especially in its patriarchal form.  
Although patriarchy has been invoked by various religious and civic governments as far back as 
Ancient Greece, it proved to be particularly important for Russia where, to use Paul Conner’s 
characterization, the state can lay claim to its own segment in ‘a fortress of father metaphors’ in 
its socio-political discourse.37  However strong this fortress may be, it is not entirely 
impenetrable, and Peter I, who through his reforms and construction projects famously cut ‘a 
window on Europe,’ inadvertently created a breeding ground for a new kind of citizens, the 
Russian intelligentsia. 
Members of the intelligentsia identified themselves as such based on not only their 
Western education, but on their moral impulse to improve Russian society as a whole by serving 
the common folk and by overthrowing the imperial regime.38  When the term ‘intelligentsia’ first 
came into use in the 1860s, its definitions included such notions as ‘educated people,’  ‘a group 
embodying Russian national consciousness,’ and ‘Russian radicals.’39   With time, members of 
the intelligentsia took upon themselves the responsibility to act as a civic conscience and to 
provide moral guidance to their fellow-citizens.40  Albeit diverse in their socioeconomic 
backgrounds and convictions, over time members of the intelligentsia turned into the 
government’s severest critics.  Sergii Bulgakov, an early twentieth-century philosopher, 
economist, Russian Orthodox theologian, and himself a lustrous representative of the 




The soul of intelligentsia, of this creation of Peter’s, is also a key to the future destiny of 
Russian statehood and its civil society.  For better or worse, the fate of Peter’s Russia is 
in the hands of intelligentsia, however persecuted and victimized it is, however weak and 
even powerless it might seem at the moment. It is that window, cut by Peter, through 
which the Western air comes to us, both life-giving and poisonous.41 
 
Because neither statehood nor the civil society is possible without a recognition of 
individual rights, members of the intelligentsia both preached, and in many cases embodied, 
what Petr Struve calls ‘self-alienation’ [отщепенство], ‘an estrangement from state structures 
and hostility towards the state.’42  In pre-Petrine Russia, positions in military or civil service to 
the prince were doled out on the basis of the rank of one’s predecessor.43  Following Peter’s 
reforms of the early 1700s, individual members of noble families could no longer rely on the 
achievements of their forebears in obtaining social prestige and material possessions.  Peter’s 
investment in the bureaucracy and in the Table of Ranks as a principal tool used in organizing 
Russia’s socio-political hierarchy and its system of rewards in effect replaced family ties with 
bureaucratic ties.44  Ranks were now distributed based on a subject’s personal achievements in 
service to the state and not on his blood kinship (Raeff, Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia 38-
41).45 
By the mid-1800s, this transformation led to an ideological division with the Slavophiles 
on one side, linking familial attachment to religious piety and love for one’s own home and 
native land, and Westernizers on the other, rejecting all of these values in the name of 
individualism and dialectical reasoning.46  Examining in retrospect the work of the Slavophiles 
and the arguments put forth by Aleksei Khomiakov as the chiefest among them, the philosopher 
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Nikolai Berdiaev, a Russian political and religious philosopher, indicted the Slavophiles for 
idealizing all civic relations in Russia and seeing them as ones based on a parent-child model:  
 
The tsar treats his people as a father treats his children. The relationships between the 
regime and the people are patriarchal and only as such can they be recognized as good 
and sacred […] The Russian people is familial and patriarchal for the most part; it loves 
not the state, but the family; it wants to live in a big family, treats the tsar like a father, 
and does not tolerate the state mechanism.47 
 
What Turgenev’s Virgin Soil presents to its readers, therefore, is a masterful study of two 
conflicting dispositions within one person—of hostility and of loyalty.  On the one hand, as a 
member of the intelligentsia, the protagonist must be and is critical of the state authority and of 
the status quo.  He resents both the state and the people who represent it, and he attempts to 
alienate himself from all of it.  On the other hand, as his father’s son, albeit illegitimate and 
unexpected, he knows that his connection to the noble class transcends mere blood kinship.  
Prince G.’s wealth and concern for his natural son’s wellbeing caused him to make provisions for 
Nezhdanov’s education and financial support.  In fact, they have made Nezhdanov the person 
that he is.   
It is this unresolved contradiction that caused Turgenev to think that neither progressive, 
nor conservative readers would in the end approve the narrative, and the author was proven right.  
The first half of the novel appeared in the January 1877 issue of The Herald of Europe, and a 
vast majority of the reviews that appeared in the ten days following the publication were 
negative.48  The government-sponsored newspaper The Voice (Golos) published a review, in 
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which G. A. Larosh, the music critic, stated that Turgenev in Virgin Soil is merely repeating his 
old themes: neither do the underground activists depicted in the novel invoke ‘any kind of artistic 
compassion’ towards themselves, nor do they add even ‘one iota’ to the body of knowledge 
‘about peculiarities of this world that was brought to us by works of other fiction writers’ 
(Lukina 24).49  In New Time, a liberal newspaper, the critic V.P. Burenin essentially repeated 
Larosh’s main point about Tugenev repeating himself (Lukina 25).50  And the unabashedly 
conservative newspaper, Citizen (Grazdanin), published editorial remarks of V.P. Meshchersky, 
in which Turgenev was accused of creating a merely superficial verbal portrait of the activists 
devoid of any warmth of feeling towards them (27).  When the second part of the novel was 
published, Meshchersky called the whole work ‘abomination’ and ‘filth.’51 
 
Conclusion 
The nuclear patriarchal family is frequently employed as a metaphor for conceptualizing 
socio-political relationships within a culture.  Russia constitutes a prime example of this trend.  
While in literary fiction in general, children tend to personify tenacity and continuity, each one 
of Turgenev’s major works in one way or another touches upon the theme of broken father-son 
relationships (Bocharov 20).  In Virgin Soil specifically, Turgenev shows the price at which this 
sort of tenacity is developed and the problems that arise when this kind of continuity is not 
possible. 
The family metaphor in Turgenev’s novel Virgin Soil serves as a tool for understanding 
the political relations between the tsar and the people in Russia of the 1870s, when the Narodniki 
movement was on the rise.  The broken relationship between the protagonist and his biological 
father and with the people of his father’s social milieau is symbolic of the intelligentsia’s 
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inability to find common ground with the tsar and his bureaucracy.  Within this framework, the 
intelligentsia plays the role of a natural son in two senses.  One, it represents a logical, albeit 
unforeseen and unexpected, outcome of Peter’s reforms that were intended to replace family ties 
with bureaucratic ties and to give opportunities for advancement to the non-noble.  Two, the 
intelligentsia, like an illegitimate child, does not fit into the official state or family structure and 
acts as an interested yet annoying outsider.   
A large portion of the radical intelligentsia comprised raznochintsy, or people of diverse 
ranks and sometimes of no rank at all.  Those of noble birth who privileged their own ideological 
reasoning over family ties may be referred to as ‘repentant nobles.’  For these people, the conflict 
between a ‘vertical’ or ‘genealogical’ self-perception (linked to one’s place within a family clan) 
and the ‘cohort thinking’ (and allegiance to one’s chosen generation) was especially difficult to 
reconcile (Lovell 567).  For them, Narodnichestvo and especially the Going to the People 
movement became a means of finding meaning in life: while solving society’s problems, the 
activists had an opportunity to overcome their own identity crisis caused by their rejection of 
their genealogical family and their fathers’ authority.  Turgenev also shows that those among the 
fathers’ generation who at times attempt to play the part of an enlightened patriarch do so more 
out of fashion than out of conviction.   
Desirous of more effective sociopolitical reforms and always standing in opposition to 
the authorities, yet never able to reason with the father/tsar, young activists and members of the 
intelligentsia turn to the ‘younger’ brothers, the uneducated worker/peasant masses, only to get 
rejected.  The latter’s faith in and loyalty to the tsar is greater than their trust towards young 
people who pretend to be like them.  For those activists who are honest with themselves, this 
element of pretense is also undeniable.  At the same time, because of their upbringing and the 
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opportunities that their lineage and socioeconomic situation afford them, members of the 
intelligentsia cannot easily deny their own privileged position.  For Turgenev, this conflict is 
insurmountable. 
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